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Abstract
The U.S. personal bankruptcy system functions as a bankruptcy system for small
businesses as well as for consumers. When firms are non-corporate, debts of the firm are
personal liabilities of the entrepreneur/owner. If the firm fails, the entrepreneur has an
incentive to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, since both business debts and the
entrepreneur’s personal debts will be discharged. The entrepreneur must give up assets
above a fixed bankruptcy exemption level for repayment to creditors, but future earnings
are entirely exempt.  Exemption levels are set by the states and they vary widely.
We show that higher bankruptcy exemption levels benefit potential entrepreneurs by
providing partial wealth insurance.  The predicted relationship between the probability of
owning a business and the exemption level is positive at low exemption levels, but may
be either positive or negative at high exemption levels, depending on whether higher
bankruptcy costs outweigh the gain from additional insurance.  We test this prediction
and find that the probability of families who are homeowners being self-employed is 35%
higher if families live in states with unlimited exemptions rather than low exemptions.
We also find evidence that families who are homeowners are more likely to start
businesses and to organize their businesses as non-corporate rather than corporate if they
live in states with high or unlimited, rather than low, bankruptcy exemptions.
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Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial Activity
1
Wei Fan and Michelle J. White
The U.S. personal bankruptcy system is primarily intended as a bankruptcy
procedure for consumers, but also is the de facto bankruptcy procedure for small firms.
When firms are non-corporate, debts of the firm are personal liabilities of the
entrepreneur/owner. If the firm fails, entrepreneurs have an incentive to file for personal
bankruptcy under Chapter 7, because both their business and personal debts will be
discharged.  Entrepreneurs must give up all of their assets above an exemption level to
repay creditors, but all of their future earnings are exempt from the obligation to repay
(this is the “fresh start” in bankruptcy). Bankruptcy exemption levels are set by the states
and they vary widely.  The higher the exemption level, the more attractive it is for
potential entrepreneurs to go into business, because more of their assets are sheltered
from creditors if the firm fails.
         In this paper we examine whether individuals are more likely to become
entrepreneurs if they live in states with higher bankruptcy exemptions.  There is a large
literature explaining whether workers choose self-employment versus working for others
and, in this paper, we test whether the bankruptcy system is a important part of the
decision. The U.S. provides a good setting for studying this question because, while
bankruptcy law is uniform across the U.S., bankruptcy exemption levels vary by state.
We first develop a model of how variations in exemption levels affect incentives to own,
start and end small businesses.  We show that higher exemption levels provide partial
                                                          
1 We are grateful for comments from Charlie Brown, Alan Schwartz, and participants at seminars at
Berkeley, Michigan, UCSD, RAND, Tilburg, the Philadelphia Fed, and the NBER Summer Institute in
Law and Economics.  The N.S.F. provided financial support under grant number NSF-SBR-9617712.3
wealth insurance, which makes potential entrepreneurs who are risk averse more likely to
choose self-employment.  We test the model empirically and find that families are more
likely to own and start businesses if they live in states with higher bankruptcy exemption
levels.
      Section 1 of the paper reviews prior literature, section 2 presents our model and, in
section 3, we discuss our data and empirical results.  Section 4 concludes and discusses
policy implications.
1.   Prior Literature
There is a fairly large literature, both theoretical and empirical, on individuals’
choice whether to work for others or to become entrepreneurs. On the theoretical side, the
two themes are risk aversion and credit constraints. In Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979),
individuals have varying degrees of risk aversion, so that more risk-averse individuals
become workers and less risk-averse individuals start firms. In Evans and Jovanovich
(1989), individuals are risk neutral, but they vary by both entrepreneurial ability and
wealth. Individuals choose to become entrepreneurs if they have high entrepreneurial
ability and choose to become workers otherwise. But because of credit constraints, the
return to being an entrepreneur depends on individuals’ initial wealth. Those who have
high entrepreneurial ability but low wealth may be constrained in their ability to borrow,
which reduces their return as entrepreneurs.
2
The empirical research on entrepreneurial behavior includes a number of studies
that test for the importance of credit constraints. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find that
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initial wealth is an important determinant of entrepreneurial success, supporting the
hypothesis that entrepreneurs whose initial wealth is low are constrained in their ability to
borrow. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) test for the importance of credit
constraints by examining a sample of individuals who received inheritances. They find
that entrepreneurs who receive inheritances are both more likely to remain in business,
and, contingent on remaining in business, their revenues increase substantially. They
interpret their results as providing evidence that entrepreneurs are credit constrained, and
that receiving an inheritance loosens the credit constraint. Other empirical research
examines the roles of racial/ethnic/immigrant status and work history in determining
whether individuals become entrepreneurs. Fairlie and Meyer (1994) find that there are
very large differences across ethnic groups in the probability of being self-employed.
Evans and Leighton (1989) find that workers are more likely to shift to self-employment
if their wages are low, if they have changed jobs frequently or been unemployed, and if
they have more assets. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (1996) and Fairlie (1999) show that family
characteristics such as whether parents are self-employed also affect whether children
choose self-employment.  Borjas (1986) examines the self-employment experience of
immigrants.  Hamilton (2000) examines earnings of self-employed versus employed
persons and finds that self-employed persons earn less and their earnings grow at a
slower rate.  He argues that this points to self-employment providing non-pecuniary
benefits.
There is also a literature on credit rationing by lenders, which examines the
conditions under which small firms are able to borrow. Petersen and Rajan (1994) show
                                                                                                                                                                            
2 Baumol (1990) discusses the importance of the policy environment, as opposed to cultural factors, in
determining the supply of entrepreneurs.5
that the length and strength of the relationship between small firms and their lenders are
important in determining whether small firms obtain loans. Cavaluzzo, Cavaluzzo and
Wolken (1999) show that small firms are more likely to be credit rationed when they are
minority-owned. Berkowitz and White (1999) show that when small firms are located in
states that have higher bankruptcy exemptions, they are more likely to be turned down for
credit.   Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) show that individual borrowers are also more




     Suppose an individual is considering becoming an entrepreneur/starting a firm.
Assume that the firm would be non-corporate and, therefore, its debts would be legal
obligations of the owner.  (We consider incentives to start a corporate firm below.)
Individuals that do not start firms are assumed to work for others.  In this section we
consider how variations in bankruptcy exemption levels affect individuals’ incentives to
be self-employed.  We also consider how variations in exemption levels affect lenders’
incentives to shut down existing firms.  Because the model is intended for empirical
testing, it is intentionally kept simple.
4
2.1. The decision to become an entrepreneur 
                                                          
3 There is also a large (and contentious) literature on whether small firms create a large fraction of new jobs
in the U.S. economy.  However this research has focussed on firms which have less versus more than 100
or 500 employees.  There has been little or no work on the employment effects of small-scale self-
employment.  For a summary of the literature, see Acs, Carlsson, and Thurik (1994).
4 We do not consider changes in bankruptcy law other than varying the exemption level. We also ignore
moral hazard considerations.   See Wang and White (2000) and Adler, Polak and Schwartz (1999) for
normative analysis of alternate bankruptcy provisions that also consider moral hazard.6
    Suppose starting a firm requires investing in a project which has a cost of I in period 1
and an uncertain return of R in period 2. In period 1, the individual has a fixed amount of
wealth W and a fixed amount of debt B > 0. The debt B is unsecured, has an interest rate
of r, and is due in period 2.  It may have been incurred in period 1 or earlier and it may be
used either to finance the project or for consumption.    If individuals decide to start
firms, their wealth in period 2 will be  R B I W + + - , which varies because R is
uncertain. Suppose  R B I W + + - = W  and suppose the density of W is  ) (W f .
In period 2, entrepreneurs may file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.
5 Suppose the
bankruptcy exemption in the entrepreneur’s state of residence is X.  In the U.S.,
bankruptcy exemptions range from zero to unlimited (for homestead equity). Suppose the
out-of-pocket cost of filing for bankruptcy is C.
6  If entrepreneurs file for bankruptcy,
then the debt of  ) 1 ( r B +  will be discharged, but they must give up any wealth they own
that exceeds the exemption level, or max ] 0 , [ X C - - W .  These funds are used for
repayment to lenders. Suppose W denotes the level of period 2 wealth at which
entrepreneurs are indifferent between filing versus not filing for bankruptcy.
Entrepreneurs’ wealth is  ) 1 ( r B + - W  if they do not file for bankruptcy and X if they do
(assuming that they pay the cost of bankruptcy C before filing).  Therefore they are
                                                          
5 There is also a second personal bankruptcy procedure, Chapter 13.  Under it, debtors are not obliged to
give up any of their assets, but they must propose a plan to repay part of their debts from future earnings.
Most debtors have few non-exempt assets, so filing under Chapter 7 is more favorable and, in fact, about
70% of all bankruptcy filings occur under Chapter 7.   Because creditors are entitled to receive under
Chapter 13 only the amount they would receive in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing and because debtors have
the right to choose between the two Chapters, debtors who file under Chapter 13 have an incentive to
propose repayment plans under which they repay no more than the value of their non-exempt assets.   We
therefore model incentives to file for bankruptcy generally as a decision to file under Chapter 7.
6 This ignores the cost of bankruptcy stigma/reduced access to credit in the future.  For entrepreneurs, the
cost of bankruptcy stigma is probably small, since it is expected that they will take risks and file for
bankruptcy if their projects fail.  Most owners of failed businesses have very large debts, so that the gain
from having the debts discharged in bankruptcy is very high.7
indifferent between filing versus not filing at the wealth level  ) 1 ( r B X + + = W . They file
for bankruptcy if  W £ W and do not file if  W > W .  Their net wealth in period 2 after
repaying the loan in full or filing for bankruptcy will be  C - W  if  C X + £ W , X  if
W £ W < +C X  and  ) 1 ( r B + - W if  W > W .
7
      The combination of borrowing and bankruptcy encourages potential entrepreneurs to
go into business by providing partial wealth insurance. This effect can be seen in Figure
1, which compares entrepreneurs’ net wealth in period 2 at varying levels of gross wealth
W if they go into business and borrow versus if they go into business but do not borrow.
Entrepreneurs who do not borrow always have net wealth of  R I W + -  (shown as the
dotted line); while entrepreneurs who borrow have net wealth of  C - W , X, or
) 1 ( r B + - W , depending on the project’s return (shown as the three part solid line). The
combination of borrowing and bankruptcy lowers entrepreneurs’ net wealth by the
amount of interest payments rB  if the project’s return is high, but raises entrepreneurs’
net wealth by the net amount of debt forgiven in bankruptcy B - C if the project’s return
is low.  Overall this transfer reduces the riskiness of period 2 net wealth. If either the
exemption level or the amount borrowed rises, then the size of the insurance effect
increases and the incentive for risk averse individuals to become entrepreneurs also
increases.
8
     Now consider lenders’ behavior.  Suppose there are many potential entrepreneurs who
are identical as of period 1 and they all apply to borrow from business lenders.  Business
                                                          
7 One question is whether potential entrepreneurs would be familiar with bankruptcy law and bankruptcy
exemptions.  We found that self-help manuals such as Legal Guide to Starting & Running a Small
Business, Vol. 1, contain a clear explanation of bankruptcy.  See Steingold (1999).
8 Note that the insurance effect of bankruptcy for entrepreneurs is similar to that of taxes.  Entrepreneurs
pay taxes if their profit is high and deduct losses if their profits are negative, assuming that their households
have other sources of taxable income.8
lenders are assumed to be risk neutral.  They are willing to lend if they expect to make
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where  f r  is lenders’ fixed opportunity cost of funds. Lenders set the interest rate r so as
to satisfy equation (1). If no interest rate satisfies (1), then they do not lend at all.
     Changes in the exemption level affect both the interest rate and whether credit
rationing occurs.  In the literature, credit rationing is usually associated with models that
assume heterogeneous borrowers and asymmetric information concerning borrowers’
types.
9 However, credit rationing may also occur even when borrowers are homogeneous
and all information is common knowledge.  To illustrate, suppose  ) (W f  is distributed
normally with a mean of 2 and a standard deviation of .25. Also suppose  1 = B ,
0 = C and  1 . 0 = f r . Then the interest rate r that satisfies eq. (1) rises at an increasing rate
as the exemption level increases. This is because borrowers are more likely to file for
bankruptcy when X is higher and lenders respond by raising the interest rate. But from
lenders’ standpoint, raising the interest rate becomes less effective as X rises, because
borrowers only repay more if they avoid bankruptcy and avoiding bankruptcy is
increasingly less likely as X gets higher.  When the exemption level is  .9 or higher (90%
or more of the loan amount), no interest rate is high enough to satisfy the zero profit
constraint and lenders therefore cease lending.  Credit rationing thus takes a simple form:
lenders lend to all potential entrepreneurs if  9 . £ X and do not lend at all if  X > .9.
                                                          
9 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is the original paper on credit rationing under asymmetric information. For a
recent paper in this literature, see Bester (1994).  See Longhofer (1997) for a model of credit rationing with
common knowledge.9
     Now suppose individuals work for others rather than starting businesses.  They may or
may not borrow in period 1, but in either case we assume that they do not file for
bankruptcy in period 2.   Their period 2 wealth is assumed to be the certain amount W .
     Individuals’ utility is assumed to depend on their net wealth and they are assumed to
be risk averse. They choose to become entrepreneurs if their expected utility in period 2
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     Now consider how changes in the exemption level affect entrepreneurs’ expected
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    Consider the special case of (3) when the interest rate is fixed, so that dr/dX = 0. This
might be the case, for example, if entrepreneurs borrow from relatives to finance their
businesses or if they receive pre-approved credit card offers in the mail which specify
lines of credit at fixed interest rates, and they use this credit to finance their businesses.
10
Since dr/dX is the fraction in the second term of (3), the value of dEU/dX in this case
                                                          
10  Other types of loans in which the interest rate is fixed include borrowing that occurred independently of
the investment project and business borrowing that is involuntary on the lender’s part (such as unpaid rent
or wages or tort judgments against the firm).10





d f X U ) ( ) ( ’ ], which must be positive.  Thus
when interest rates are fixed and credit is available, increases in the exemption level
unambiguously raise the attractiveness of owning a business. Also, individuals’ fixed
utility level from working for others,  ) (W U , does not depend on X.  Therefore when
loans are available at fixed interest rates, an increase in the exemption level always
increases the attractiveness of going into business relative to working for others.
    Now consider a second special case when the interest rate is endogenous, but the cost
of bankruptcy C is zero.  Then the sign of dEU/dX in (3) becomes the sign of:
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This expression equals entrepreneurs’ marginal utility of wealth when they file for
bankruptcy and keep X minus their average marginal utility of wealth when they avoid
bankruptcy and keep  ). 1 ( r B + - W  For risk averse entrepreneurs, expression (4) must be
positive, since their wealth when they file for bankruptcy is lower than their wealth when
they avoid bankruptcy, so their marginal utility of wealth must be higher when they file
for bankruptcy.  Thus when C = 0, increases in the exemption level unambiguously raise
risk averse individuals’ expected utility from becoming entrepreneurs, as long as credit is
available.  This is because entrepreneurs pay a fair price via the interest rate for the
partial wealth insurance that bankruptcy provides.  Because risk averse individuals
always wish to purchase additional insurance if it is sold at a fair price, having a higher
exemption level must make them better off.11
     Finally, suppose C is positive, but not too large.  In this case the sign of expression (3)
is ambiguous, since the second term in (3) becomes more negative as C rises. Thus at any
given exemption level, dEU/dX must be positive if C=0, but it gets smaller and may
become negative as C rises.  The reason is that, when C is positive, entrepreneurs pay for
additional bankruptcy insurance as X rises both via higher interest rates and via higher
expected bankruptcy costs.  Because the cost of insurance exceeds its fair price, only risk
averse entrepreneurs demand it and demand increases as entrepreneurs’ degree of risk
aversion rises.  There is likely to be an internal optimal exemption level which depends
positively on entrepreneurs’ level of risk aversion.
     As an illustration, suppose the utility function is U = (Net Wealth)
a .  Some
entrepreneurs have high risk tolerance/low risk aversion ( 8 . = a ) and others have low
risk tolerance/high risk aversion ( 2 . = a ).  Assume that the parameters of the previous
simulation remain the same, except that bankruptcy costs can be either zero or .1.  Figure
2 illustrates how expected utility varies with the exemption level for both types, at the
two different levels of bankruptcy cost. When bankruptcy is costless, the expected utility
level of both types of individuals rises monotonically as X increases, as long as loans are
available.  Thus the optimal level of X is the highest level at which lenders are willing to
lend.  But when bankruptcy is costly, entrepreneurs with high risk tolerance have an
optimal exemption level of zero, while individuals with low risk tolerance have an
optimal exemption level of  X = .35.  Thus the gain from having some wealth insurance
rather than none more than offsets bankruptcy costs for risk averse individuals.  But if
bankruptcy costs are high, they eventually more than offset the gain from having
additional wealth insurance.12
2.2  The decision to shut down a business
Now consider how changes in the exemption level affect whether businesses in
financial distress shut down.   For most small businesses, the timing of shutdown is
determined by when creditors foreclose on equipment that is essential to the firms’
operations (see LoPucki, 1983, for discussion).
         Assume that a failing firm’s creditor has a choice between shutting the firm down in
period 2 versus allowing it to continue to operate until period 3. Because of the firm’s
poor financial condition, we assume that the entrepreneur cannot obtain new loans from
either new or old creditors.   If the firm continues to operate for an additional period, then
the entrepreneur’s gross wealth in period 3 is denoted Z, which has the distribution  ) (Z g .
The firm’s debt at the end of period 2 is assumed to be  B’, which exceeds  B because of
accrued interest and default charges. In period 3, the firm therefore owes B’(1+r).
Because the loan is in default, the interest rate r is fixed.  The creditor’s expected return if
the firm continues to operate until period 3 is:
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where Z denotes the level of gross wealth in period 3 at which the entrepreneur is
indifferent between filing versus not filing for bankruptcy.
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Since (6) must be negative, creditors’ expected gain from allowing failing firms to
continue operating is smaller in states with higher exemption levels.
       Now consider creditors’ gain from shutting the firm down in period 2.   Because the
firm is failing, we assume that entrepreneurs will file for bankruptcy when the firm shuts
down.  Either of two possible outcomes may occur.  In the first, entrepreneurs’ assets Z
are less than X+C, so that creditors receive nothing.   In this situation, creditors have a
stronger incentive to shut failing firms down if firms are located in states with higher
bankruptcy exemptions, because creditors’ return from allowing firms to continue is
negatively related to the exemption level while their return from shutting firms down is
independent of the exemption level.  In the second, the entrepreneur’s assets are between
X+C and Z , so that creditors receive  C X Z - -   if the firm shuts down. In this latter
case, creditors’ incentive is ambiguous since, in states with higher exemptions, they
receive less from allowing failing firms to continue and they also receive less from
shutting failing firms down immediately.  However the first case seems more likely to
occur than the second, because owners of failing firms have an incentive to protect their
assets from creditors by shifting them from non-exempt to exempt categories before the
business shuts down.
11
      Therefore the model suggests that creditors are more likely to shut failing firms down
immediately rather than allowing them to continue operating if firms are located in states
with high exemption levels.  We test this hypothesis in the empirical work below.
12
2.3  Summary
                                                          
11 Z  includes both personal and business assets of the entrepreneur.  Entrepreneurs can protect assets from
creditors by, for example, transferring business assets to exempt personal categories.
12 In some cases entrepreneurs may prefer to shut their failing firms down immediately---even if creditors
allow them to continue operating---because they can do better working for others.14
We have shown the following:  (1) The bankruptcy system makes going into
business more attractive to potential entrepreneurs by providing them with partial wealth
insurance.   (2)  If the interest rate on business loans is fixed or if the cost of filing for
bankruptcy is zero, then entrepreneurs prefer that the exemption level be the highest level
at which loans are available.  If the interest rate on loans is endogenously determined and
the cost of filing for bankruptcy is positive, then increases in the exemption level may
raise the attractiveness of owning a business at low exemption levels, but lower the
attractiveness of owning a business at higher exemption levels.  (3)  Existing firms are
more likely to shut down if they are located in states with higher exemption levels.
3.  Empirical Tests
Our empirical work explains whether families own, start or end businesses as a
function of the bankruptcy exemption in the state where the family lives and other
variables. We use family-level panel data from two different Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) panels.  The first panel consists of families who were
interviewed in 1993, 1994, and 1995 and the second consists of families who were
interviewed in 1996, 1997, and 1998.  Each panel contains about 20,000 families.  Our
dataset combines the two panels, so that it covers the period 1993 through 1998.  Because
different questions about self-employment were asked in the two panels, we categorize
families as self-employed in 1993-95 if anyone in the family owned a business and did
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not work at a job, while we categorize families as self-employed during 1996-98l if any
family member(s) owned one or more businesses.  The sample size is about 98,000.
13
   Bankruptcy is a matter of Federal law. In 1978, Congress adopted a new Bankruptcy
Code, which specified a nationally uniform bankruptcy exemption (the Federal
exemption).  However Congress also gave the states the right to opt out of the Federal
exemption by adopting their own exemptions.  All states did so by 1982, although about
one-third of the states allowed their residents to choose between the state’s exemption
and the Federal exemption.  Since 1982, the pattern has been that only a few states
change their exemption levels each year, mainly to correct nominal exemption levels for
inflation.
14  Because most states adopted their bankruptcy exemptions in response to the
passage of the 1978 Federal Bankruptcy Code, we treat exemption levels as exogenous to
families’ self-employment decisions.
  States have bankruptcy exemptions for various types of property, but the largest and
most variable is the exemption for equity in owner-occupied housing---the “homestead”
exemption.
15  Homestead exemptions range from zero (in Maryland) to unlimited (in
Texas, Florida and several other states).  High homestead exemptions reduce the risk of
owning a business because, if the business fails, entrepreneurs are less likely to lose their
homes or to lose their non-housing assets.  Homestead exemptions also protect
entrepreneurs’ non-housing assets because non-housing assets can be converted into
home equity by using the assets to pay down a mortgage, as long as entrepreneurs’ home
                                                          




We include only families that responded to all three of the relevant waves.  Variables that are reported at
the household or individual level are converted to the family level.  (The SIPP is available from
www.bls.census.gov/sipp.)
14 The Federal homestead exemption remained the same from 1978 to 1994, when it was doubled from
$7,500 to $15,000.   See Elias et al (1994 and other editions) for exemption levels by state.16
equity is less than the homestead exemption.  We therefore use the homestead exemption
as our bankruptcy exemption variable.
16
    Some states allow married couples to take larger homestead exemptions if they file
for bankruptcy jointly.  We therefore adjust the exemption level if the family head is
married and lives in a state that allows married couples to claim a larger exemption. In
states that allow bankruptcy filers to choose between the state and the Federal
exemptions, we use the Federal homestead exemption if it is larger. We divide the
distribution of homestead exemptions into quartiles and use separate dummy variables to
represent each quartile of the distribution except the lowest.  We also use a separate
dummy variable for states with unlimited homestead exemptions. States with unlimited
homestead exemptions are coded as having the highest “limited” exemption level, so that
the unlimited exemption coefficient captures the effect of the exemption being unlimited
rather than high. Finally, renters who file for bankruptcy cannot make use of the
homestead exemption and are therefore less protected against the risk of their businesses
failing.  To take account of this, we interact all of the exemption variables with whether
families own or rent their homes. The lowest exemption quartile for renters is the omitted
exemption category.
  Now consider other variables.  The SIPP asks separate questions concerning how
much families earn from working for others versus from self-employment. Because
families whose workers are partly or fully self-employed spend less time working for
others, we first estimate an OLS model that explains the log of earnings for families that
                                                                                                                                                                            
15 Most states also have exemptions for household belongings, equity in vehicles, retirement accounts, and
a wildcard category that can be applied to any type of asset, but they are almost always small.
16  See White (1998) for discussion of other strategies to convert assets from non-exempt to exempt.17
do not have self-employment earnings.  The explanatory variables are the head’s
education level, the head’s age, and demographic variables.  We use the results of this
model to predict the log of earnings from working for others, for those families that have
self-employment earnings.  The predicted values are an estimate of the amount that
families with self-employment would earn if all of their workers spent all of their time
working for others, or the opportunity cost of becoming self-employed. The combined
distribution of predicted log earnings for families with self-employment and actual log
earnings for families without self-employment is divided into quartiles and we construct
dummy variables for each quartile, omitting the lowest.
17
      We also have data on income from wealth, retirement income, and income from
transfers. We divide the distribution of income from wealth into four categories, of which
the lowest category consists of non-positive values and the three highest categories each
contain the same number of families.  We exclude the non-positive values and enter
separate dummy variables for each category of positive values (the latter are referred to
as quartiles of the income from wealth distribution).  We follow the same procedure for
retirement income and income from transfers.
     We also enter a vector of demographic variables as additional controls: the number of
earners in the family, the head’s education level in years, the age of the head in decades
(under thirty is the excluded category and each variable represents the marginal effect of
being one decade older), and dummy variables for the number of persons in the family
(one person families are excluded), for whether the head is married, whether the head is a
single female, whether the head is African-American, Mexican, other Spanish, or Eastern
                                                          
17 We ignore the possibility of selection bias in predicting self-employed families’ earnings from working
for others.   Selection bias will not be a problem if, for example, the same characteristics that make18
European, and whether the family lives in a metropolitan area. Additional variables
capture local macroeconomic conditions and other state policies that might affect the
decision to be self-employed.  These include the state unemployment rate, the fraction of
the labor force that is employed in the non-farm sector, the rate of growth of output in the
state over the past year, and the maximum state income tax rate.  We enter the non-farm
employment rate as a correction for the fraction of state economic activity that is due to
farming, since different bankruptcy law provisions apply to farms. The maximum state
tax rate is entered because self-employment presents greater opportunities for tax evasion
and evasion is more valuable when the tax rate is higher.
18  Finally, we enter year effects
and a dummy variable that differentiates between the two SIPP panels (results not
reported).
     Summary statistics are given in table A1.  The probability of owning a business is .11.
Note that the average business, however, is small:  mean revenues during the previous
year were about $2,400.
     3.1  The decision to own a business. Our benchmark case is a random effects probit
model that explains whether families own businesses.  The results, in columns (1) and (2)
of table 1, show that all of the exemption variables are positive and statistically
significant for homeowners and the unlimited exemption variable is positive and
statistically significant for renters.   We also tested for whether the third and fourth
quartile and unlimited exemption variables for homeowners are significantly different
from the lowest quartile variable for homeowners and found that they are (p values are
.0199, .0078, and .0000, respectively).  Table 2, column (1), shows the predicted
                                                                                                                                                                            
individuals successful in working for others also make them successful as entrepreneurs.
18 All calculations use weights that make the sample representative of U.S. families.19
probabilities of owning a business at varying exemption levels.
19  For homeowners, the
probability of owning a business increases from .10 when the homestead exemption is in
the lowest two quartiles to  .11 when the exemption is in the highest two quartiles and
jumps to .135 when the exemption is unlimited.  The relationship between the exemption
level and homeowners’ probability of owning businesses is monotonically increasing,
rather than rising at low exemption levels and then falling.  The increase in the
probability of owning a business from the lowest exemption level to unlimited is about
35%.  For renters, the probability of owning a business rises from .08 at the lowest
exemption level to .107 when the exemption is unlimited, but the increase is not
monotonic.  These results imply that homeowners respond strongly to increases in the
homestead exemption in making their decisions to become self-employed, while renters
also respond, but less strongly.   Presumably, many renters deciding whether to become
entrepreneurs expect to be homeowners in the future.
     The results for other variables imply that families are significantly more likely to be
self-employed if they have more earners, live in non-metropolitan areas, have more
educated heads, have heads in their 30’s or older rather than in their 20’s, have earnings
from working for others that are in the middle two quartiles of the distribution, or have
income from wealth in the highest quartile of the distribution.  Families are less likely to
be self-employed as they become larger, if they have retirement income in the highest
quartile, if the head is over 70, if the head is a single female or is African-American,
Mexican or from another Spanish-speaking country.  The state unemployment rate is
positive and significant, suggesting that families are more likely to be self-employed
                                                          
19 We predict the probability of being self-employed separately for each family, using the family’s actual
characteristics and the specified exemption level. We then take a weighted average of the predictions.20
when fewer jobs are available.  The maximum state income tax rate is also positive and
significant, suggesting that families are more likely to be self-employed in states where
the gain from evading taxes is higher. Our results concerning race and ethnic background
are similar to those found by Fairlie and Meyers (1994) and Borjas (1986).  The results
concerning wealth support findings of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Holtz-Eakin,
Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) that wealth constraints are important determinants of whether
families are self-employed.
20
     3.2  The decision to own a “big” business.  Because the average business in our
dataset is small, we reran the benchmark case, but classified families as self-employed
only if their business income was greater than $2,000 per month.  The results are shown
in table 1, columns (3) and (4).  Only the unlimited exemption variable for owners is
significantly different from the lowest quartile exemption variable for owners (p < .0000).
The predictions are shown in table 2, column (2).  The predicted probability of owning a
business for homeowners rises from .047 in the lowest quartile of the exemption
distribution to .060 when the exemption is unlimited, or by about 28%.  For renters, the
unlimited exemption variable is also positive and significant at the 10% level.  The
probability of renters owning big businesses rises from about .035 in the lowest quartile
of the exemption distribution to .045 in states with unlimited exemptions.
     3.3  Choice of organizational form.  We also examined whether bankruptcy law
affects families’ decisions to organize their businesses in corporate versus non-corporate
form. As discussed above, higher bankruptcy exemption levels make it more attractive to
own a non-corporate business relative to working for others.  This is because, while
                                                          
20 As additional robustness checks, we reran the benchmark model using random effects GLS rather than
probit and separately reran the benchmark model omitting the earnings variables and the income from21
business owners are personally liable for their business debts, they can file for bankruptcy
if the business fails.  The higher the exemption level, the more of their business and
personal assets they can keep in bankruptcy.  In contrast when businesses are corporate,
owners’ assets and debts are legally distinct from the assets and debts of their
corporations, so that owners are not liable for the losses of their corporations.  But when
corporations make losses and file for corporate bankruptcy, owners cannot keep any of
the corporation’s  assets.  Strictly speaking, this means that whether the bankruptcy
exemption level is high or low should have no effect on how favorable it is to own a
corporate business relative to working for others.  However, in practice business lenders
often require that owners personally guarantee loans to their small corporate businesses
and these guarantees muddy the distinction between corporate versus non-corporate
businesses.
21  As a result, states with higher personal bankruptcy exemption levels may
be more attractive environments for families to own both types of businesses.
22
      The SIPP asks families if their businesses are non-corporate or corporate.  We ran a
weighted multinomial logit model explaining whether families own incorporated
businesses, non-corporate businesses, or no business.
23    The results (not shown) indicate
that the exemption variables are strongly statistically significant in the decision by
homeowners whether to own unincorporated businesses, but are less statistically
significant in the decision by homeowners to own corporate businesses or the decision by
renters to own either type of business.  For non-corporate businesses of homeowners, the
third and fourth quartile and unlimited exemption variables are all significantly different
                                                                                                                                                                            
wealth, transfer and pension variables.  The results (not shown) were very similar to the benchmark model.
21 Berkowitz and White (1999) found that business lenders ignore organizational form when deciding
whether to offer loans to small businesses.22
from the lowest quartile exemption variable for homeowners (the  p values are .011, <
.0000, and < .0000, respectively).  For corporate businesses of homeowners, the
unlimited exemption category is significantly higher than the lowest quartile exemption
variable for homeowners (p = .0054).  The predicted probabilities of owning corporate
and non-corporate businesses are shown in table 2, columns (3) and (4).  For
homeowners, the probability of owning a non-corporate business rises from about .08 in
the lower half of the exemption distribution to .11 when the exemption level is unlimited,
or by about 37%.   Homeowners’ probability of owning corporate businesses rises from
about .026 in the lower half of the exemption distribution to .029 when the exemption is
unlimited, or by about 15%.    For renters, the probability of owning non-corporate
businesses rises from about .054 in the lowest quartile of the exemption distribution to
083 when the exemption is unlimited, but the probability of renters owning corporate
businesses is unrelated to exemption levels.  Thus exemption levels have an important
effect on whether both groups own non-corporate businesses, but they affect only
homeowners’ decisions to own corporate businesses.
3.4  The decision to start a business.  Now turn to families’ decisions to start
businesses. Define a dummy variable for starting a business which equals one if a family
did not own a business in 1993, 1994, 1996, or 1997, but owned a business in the
following year.  (Because different SIPP panels are used for 1995 versus 1996, we have
no information on business starts between these two years.)  The explanatory variables
are the same as those used previously. Explanatory variables for each year are used to
explain whether families started businesses between that year and the next.  The sample
                                                                                                                                                                            
22 Most small firms have a tax incentive to choose non-corporate status, since the firm’s losses can then be
deducted against other income of the entrepreneur or spouse. See Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1994).23
consists of families in both SIPP panels that did not own businesses in the earlier year.
Because we lose two years of data, the sample size falls to about 58,000.
      In table 3, columns (1) and (2), we report the results of a random effects probit model
explaining whether families start businesses. For homeowners, the third quartile, fourth
quartile, and unlimited exemption variables all have positive signs, but only the unlimited
exemption variable is significantly different from the lowest quartile exemption variable
for homeowners (p = .08).  Of the exemption variables for renters, only the 4
th quartile
variable is significantly greater than the lowest quartile value for renters.  The predicted
probabilities are shown in table 4, column (1). The probability of homeowners starting
businesses rises from  .023 in the lowest quartile of the exemption distribution to .028 in
unlimited exemption states, or by about 22%.   For renters, the probability of owning a
business is .019 in the lowest quartile, falls slightly, and then rises to .027 in the highest
quartile and .022 in unlimited exemption states.
   Among the other variables, the only significantly positive factor in families’
decisions to start businesses is the head having more years of education. Significantly
negative factors include having a single female head, having a head who is over 60,
having a Mexican or African-American head, or having higher earnings from working at
a job.  None of the state level macroeconomic variables or the maximum tax rate variable
is statistically significant.
 3.5  The decision to end a business.  We used the analogous procedure to examine the
probability of existing businesses shutting down.  Define a dummy variable for ending a
business which equals one if a family owned a business in 1993, 1994, 1996, or 1997 but
did not own a business in 1994, 1995, 1997, or 1998, respectively.  Again we have no
                                                                                                                                                                            
23 If families own more than one business, we use the organizational type of the first business reported.24
data for the decision to end businesses between 1995 and 1996, because of the change in
the SIPP panel composition.  Explanatory variables for earlier years are used to explain
whether families end businesses between that year and the next.  The sample includes
only families that owned businesses in the earlier year, so that the sample size is only
about 7,200.  The specification otherwise remains the same.
        The results are shown in table 3, columns (3) and (4).  The exemption variables are
consistently negative for owners, but none is significantly different from the lowest
quartile value for owners.  The predicted probabilities of businesses shutting down are
shown in table 4, column (2). For homeowners, the probability of ending a business rises
fairly monotonically from about .141 in the lowest exemption states to .167 in states with
unlimited exemptions, or by about 18%.  For renters, the probability of ending a business
rises from .22 in the lowest exemption states to .244 in states with unlimited exemptions,
although the increase is not monotonic. Thus the results suggest that businesses owned by
both owners and renters are more likely to shut down when they are located in states with
higher bankruptcy exemption levels, but the results are not statistically significant for
either group.
     Among the other variables, businesses owned by families with heads in their 60’s are
more likely to close than those owned by families with younger heads. Also families
with transfer income above the lowest quartile are significantly more likely to close their
businesses, while families with high income from wealth are significantly less likely to
close their businesses.  The latter result provides additional support for the hypothesis
that wealth constraints are an important determinant of the success of small businesses.
Finally, businesses owned by families with more earners are significantly more likely to25
close, perhaps because multiple-earner families are less dependent on their business
earnings.
4.  Conclusion
    In this paper, we test whether potential entrepreneurs are more likely to own, start and
end small businesses if they live in states with higher personal bankruptcy exemptions.
Entrepreneurs benefit from higher personal bankruptcy exemptions because exemptions
provide partial wealth insurance, although at the cost of a reduction in credit availability
as the exemption level rises.   Exemption levels are set by the states and they vary widely.
We find that families who are homeowners are about 35% more likely to own businesses
if they live in states with high or unlimited rather than low homestead exemptions, and
the difference is statistically significant.  Renters are 22% more likely to own businesses
if they live in high exemption states and this difference is also statistically significant.
Families’ decisions to own non-corporate businesses are more responsive to changes in
exemption levels than their decisions to own corporate businesses.   Bankruptcy
exemptions also affect the decision to start a business:  homeowners are  22% more likely
to start businesses if they live in states with unlimited rather than low homestead
exemptions, although the relationship is only significant at the 10% level.  We did not
find significant support for the hypothesis that entrepreneurs are more likely to end their
businesses if they live in states with unlimited rather than low homestead exemptions.
      During each of the past few years, Congress has passed legislation to reform personal
bankruptcy law, which President Clinton has consistently threatened to veto.  While the
bills have varied, they all involve making it substantially more difficult for debtors to26
qualify for discharge of debt in bankruptcy, either by requiring that debtors who have
greater than the median earnings level repay part of their debt from future earnings or by
capping the maximum homestead exemption, or both.  These reforms are intended to
reduce abuse of the bankruptcy system, particularly by relatively well-off debtors.
However our analysis suggests that an unintended consequence of adopting these reforms
would be a substantial reduction in the level of self-employment by U.S. households.   To
the extent that self-employment provides additional jobs, making personal bankruptcy
procedures tougher could reduce the rate of growth in the U.S. economy.27
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Table 1. Effects of Bankruptcy on Whether Families Own Businesses
Probit with random effects Big business
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variables Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
1
st quartile – owner 0.119 0.037 0.158 0.057
2
nd quartile – renter 0.0229 0.039 0.0940 0.063
2
nd quartile – owner 0.136 0.037 0.130 0.057
3
rd quartile – renter 0.0753 0.043 0.0096 0.066
3
rd quartile – owner 0.175 0.038 0.170 0.057
4
th quartile – renter 0.0235 0.050 0.0133 0.069
4
th quartile – owner 0.201 0.042 0.210 0.060
Unlimited – renter 0.155 0.051 0.131 0.075
Unlimited – owner 0.312 0.042 0.293 0.060
Number of earners 0.359 0.011 0.106 0.013
Metropolitan area -0.0690 0.019 -0.0077 0.025
Education level 0.0101 0.002 0.0159 0.003
Single female head -0.409 0.034 -0.583 0.047
Married head -0.0302 0.038 -0.0382 0.052
2-person family -0.0944 0.033 0.0462 0.051
3-person family -0.203 0.038 -0.0989 0.056
4-person family -0.222 0.042 -0.0167 0.060
5-person family -0.253 0.047 0.0510 0.064
>=6 person family -0.190 0.059 0.144 0.079
30<= age < 40 0.192 0.032 0.261 0.044
40<= age < 50 0.0796 0.020 0.0811 0.026
50<= age < 60 0.0091 0.021 0.0127 0.027
60<= age < 70 0.0512 0.025 -0.0361 0.038
age >= 70 -0.147 0.033 -0.245 0.056
2
nd quartile earnings 0.362 0.022 0.511 0.037
3
rd quartile earnings 0.256 0.023 0.516 0.036
4
th quartile earnings -0.0124 0.026 0.439 0.039
2
nd quartile wealth income -0.0171 0.013 -0.0237 0.022
3
rd quartile wealth income 0.0115 0.015 0.0546 0.024
4
th quartile wealth income 0.0905 0.016 0.199 0.026
2
nd quartile transfer income -0.0075 0.025 -0.153 0.037
3
rd quartile transfer income -0.0091 0.027 -0.169 0.046
4
th quartile transfer income -0.0896 0.030 -0.267 0.046
2
nd quartile retirement inc. -0.0842 0.037 -0.219 0.070
3
rd quartile retirement inc. -0.0303 0.037 -0.116 0.079
4
th quartile retirement inc. -0.0768 0.033 -0.193 0.074
Eastern Europe 0.0500 0.053 0.0774 0.056
Mexican -0.230 0.062 -0.306 0.073
Other Spanish -0.171 0.050 -0.165 0.061
African-American -0.466 0.064 -0.582 0.097
Other ethnic groups -0.0164 0.022 -0.0455 0.026
State GDP growth rate -0.156 0.25 -0.322 0.44
State unemp rate 1.83 0.78 2.39 1.1
Non-farming employment -0.391 0.19 -0.310 0.22
Max state income tax rate 0.924 0.33 0.644 0.40
Constant -1.90 0.20 -2.75 0.2431
Table 2:
















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Owners
1
st quartile .101 .0470 .0796 .0258
2
nd quartile .103 .0446 .0784 .0261
3
rd quartile  .110* .0481 .0872* .0246
4
th quartile  .114* .0517 .101* .0200*
Unlimited  .135* .0600* .110* .0294*
Renters
1
st quartile .083 .0347 .0534 .0188
2
nd quartile .086 .0417 .0706 .0218
3
rd quartile  .094 .0354 .0710* .0134
4
th quartile  .086 .0356 .0734* .0126*
Unlimited  .107* .0447 .0834* .0183
Asterisks indicate that the variable is significantly higher than the relevant 1
st quartile
level for homeowners or renters, whichever is relevant.32
Table 3.   Effect of Bankruptcy on
Whether Families Start and End Businesses
Random-Effect Probit Model              Start businesses        End businesses
Explanatory Variables Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
1
st quartile – owner 0.0669 0.066 -0.313 0.13
2
nd quartile – renter -0.0916 0.075 -0.354 0.14
2
nd quartile – owner 0.0117 0.065 -0.240 0.13
3
rd quartile – renter -0.0238 0.076 0.0624 0.14
3
rd quartile – owner 0.0839 0.066 -0.265 0.13
4
th quartile – renter 0.147 0.076 0.0074 0.15
4
th quartile – owner 0.150 0.072 -0.226 0.13
Unlimited – renter 0.0589 0.080 0.0867 0.15
Unlimited – owner 0.158 0.068 -0.195 0.13
Number of earners 0.0174 0.023 0.106 0.052
Live in a metropolitan area -0.0535 0.031 0.106 0.052
Education level 0.0137 0.0031 -0.0049 0.0060
Single female head -0.245 0.047 0.236 0.087
Married head 0.0272 0.060 -0.0450 0.10
2-person family 0.0264 0.053 0.108 0.093
3-person family 0.0586 0.061 0.146 0.10
4-person family 0.0826 0.065 0.147 0.11
5-person family 0.0927 0.074 0.135 0.12
6 more person family 0.0727 0.090 0.149 0.14
30<= age < 40 0.0132 0.044 -0.348 0.086
40<= age < 50 -0.0382 0.035 -0.0869 0.054
50<= age < 60 -0.0499 0.042 -0.0516 0.062
60<= age < 70 -0.227 0.058 0.164 0.091
Age >= 70 -0.326 0.064 0.124 0.10
2
nd quartile earnings -0.0636 0.043 -0.0655 0.088
3
rd quartile earnings -0.117 0.047 -0.135 0.13
4
th quartile earnings -0.138 0.055 -0.112 0.18
2
nd quartile wealth income 0.0293 0.036 -0.0660 0.57
3
rd quartile wealth income 0.0075 0.039 -0.126 0.056
4
th quartile wealth income 0.0574 0.041 -0.133 0.056
2
nd quartile transfer income -0.0697 0.055 0.414 0.088
3
rd quartile transfer income -0.0888 0.060 0.389 0.093
4
th quartile transfer income 0.0121 0.059 0.244 0.10
2
nd quartile retirement inc. 0.0814 0.072 0.237 0.12
3
rd quartile retirement inc. 0.0098 0.081 0.183 0.12
4
th quartile retirement inc. -0.128 0.089 0.0479 0.12
Eastern Europe 0.0140 0.068 -0.0552 0.13
Mexican -0.225 0.085 0.0627 0.14
Other Spanish -0.116 0.064 -0.0677 0.11
African-American -0.374 0.081 0.189 0.15
State unemployment rate 1.67 1.6 5.77 2.3
Non-farming employment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max state income tax rate 0.279 0.469 1.01 0.73
Constant -2.30 0.14 -0.817 0.2533
Table 4:










st quartile .0226 .141
2
nd quartile .0198 .157
3
rd quartile .0234 .151
4




st quartile .0193 .219
2
nd quartile .0155 .132
3
rd quartile .0183 .237
4
th quartile .0270 .217
Unlimited .0221 .24434
Table A1.   Summary Statistics
SIPP
1993-95 and 1996-98 panels
(1) (2)
Mean  s.d.
Own business .110 .313
Start business .0299 .170
End business .0294 .169
Own incorporated bus. .0330 .178
Exemption (000$) 62.8 71.8
Unlimited exemption .182 .386
1
st quartile – renter/owner .064/.136 .245/.343
2
nd quartile – renter/owner .068/.152 .252/.359
3
rd quartile – renter/owner .065/.155 .247/.362
4
th quartile – renter/owner .060/.118 .237/.323
Unlimited – renter/owner .054/.128 .226/.334
Business revenue (if own business) $2,385 $4,368
Number of earners 1.15 .924
Metropolitan area .772 .419
Own their home .689 .463
Education level 9.33 9.00
Single female head .286 .452
Married head .551 .497
Family size 2.45 1.42
Head’s age 49.8 16.8
Log earnings 7.87 .95
Wealth income (000$) 156 640
Transfer income (000$) 212 569
Retirement inc. (000$) 147 582
Eastern Europe  .0350 .184
Mexican .0315 .175
Other Spanish .0453 .208
African-American .593 .236
Other ethnic groups .355 .478
State GDP growth rate .0273 .0149
State unemp. rate .0554 .014
Non-farming employment share .886 .061
Max. state income tax rate .0556 .032
Own “big” business .049 .216
Business revenue (big business only) $5,727 6,10435
Figure 1. The Insurance Effect of Bankruptcy
Net W ealth





Figure 2. Effect of Bankruptcy Exemption on the Utility Levels of Risk
Averse Individuals

























































a = 0.8 C=0.0
C=0.1